Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains by Schlosser, Markus E.
Bending it Like Beckham: Movement, Control and Deviant Causal Chains 
MARKUS E. SCHLOSSER 
 
Forthcoming in Analysis 
This is the author’s copy that may differ from the final print version 
 
Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the 
problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the 
assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their 
contents (Schlosser 2007). This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). 
First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative. 
The most difficult cases of causal deviance share the following structure. There is 
an agent’s mental state or event, R, that rationalizes the performance of an action of type 
A. R causes an intermediary state, N, which causes a movement of type M. This 
movement would constitute or realize an instance of A-ing, were it not caused by N. 
Typically, N is a state that appears to undermine the agent’s control over the movement, 
such as a state of severe nervousness, and so it seems clear that the agent does not 
perform an action at all. But according to a causal theory, the agent performs an A-ing, as 
M is both caused and rationalized by R. (I called this the problem of basic deviance, as it 
concerns the performance of basic actions.) 
I argued that this problem does not arise if the theory requires that the mental 
antecedent must cause and explain the action in virtue of its intentional content. R causes 
and rationalizes M, but it does not cause and explain it in virtue of its content. I have also 
offered a response to the following challenge. 
The solution is unproblematic if there is no causal intermediary, and it appears to 
rule out states such as nervousness or agitation. But sometimes, perhaps even always, the 
causal chain that connects the mental antecedent and the action runs through numerous 
causal intermediaries. These intermediaries are typically not intentional or content-
bearing states (think, for instance, of all the events that connect brain activity and muscle 
movement). Given this, the condition that basic actions must be caused and explained in 
virtue of content is obviously too strong. 
My response was that this objection confuses levels of explanation. The causal 
chains that realize the mental causation of actions are highly complex chains at lower 
levels of explanation. But at the level of intentional explanation, we can identify only 
states and events such as intentions, actions, nervousness, and so on. According to 
Tännsjö, this ‘misses the point’: 
 
The problem is not that there are always causal chains that run through non-
intentional states and, in particular, the problem is not that theses chains appear at 
the neurophysiological level. The problem is that there are some cases where even 
folk psychology allows for such non-intentional parts of an action. A simple 
example is when I kick a ball. There are many movements of my legs that are not 
made in response to the content of my wish to kick the ball […]. (2009: 470). 
 
I am happy to grant the first point, as I did not mean to suggest that that is the problem. 
The important question is whether there are any robust examples that raise a problem for 
my solution. There is a problem if there are examples of non-deviant causation in which 
the causal chain passes through an intermediary event, at the level of commonsense 
psychology, that lacks intentional content. Tännsjö has not identified such an event, 
because he has not identified any causal intermediary. In the example, he talks about the 
‘non-intentional parts of an action’ (my emphasis). Whatever is a part of an action cannot 
possibly be its cause. This seems so clear to me that I am simply puzzled by the objection. 
In general, this kind of challenge raises difficult questions concerning the 
metaphysics of action and mental causation. How are actions and events to be 
individuated? What is the relationship between actions and movements? Do mental states 
cause actions or movements? And so forth. The proponents of the challenge tend to 
ignore this, as they take their point to be just obvious. But a little bit more care is required. 
As I see it, the mental causation of action takes place, strictly, at the level of 
commonsense psychology. If the action is an overt action, then there is a sense in which 
the mental antecedent causes a movement. But this does not mean that it causes the chain 
of events that leads to the movement as it is described at a lower level. The notion of 
movement is ambiguous. In a sense, movements belong to the level of commonsense 
psychology. We say that the trembling of his hands was caused by his nervousness, for 
instance. But movements belong also to lower levels of scientific explanation. When my 
intention to raise an arm causes a movement, it causes a movement in the first sense. It 
causes a rising of an arm, which is one coarse-grained event at the level of commonsense 
psychology. 
Let us return to the example. The agent kicks the ball by performing a certain type 
of kicking movement. This kicking move is the basic action. As an action, it has no parts 
(in the way in which taking the bus may be a part of travelling to Rome, for instance). At 
the lower level, the movement has a multitude of parts. But this is not a problem, as the 
intention causes the action. Of course, the parts of the movement, as they appear at the 
lower level, must also be initiated and guided. This is achieved by a so-called motor-
programme. This type of entity belongs to a lower level of explanation, and the guidance 
that is provided by the motor system is unintentional and below the level of 
consciousness. 
Arguably, the movement has parts at the level of commonsense psychology as 
well, as Tännsjö suggests. But this is beside the point. The action of kicking must be 
performed in response to the intention. This single action is constituted by one movement. 
The fact that this movement has parts is irrelevant, because my view does not require that 
such parts must be caused by a mental antecedent in virtue of its content. 
 
An Alternative Solution? 
Tännsjö suggests that we can solve the problem of causal deviance for particular types of 
action, and that there is, therefore, no need for a general solution. To my mind, this 
dialectic seems strange, because it seems strange to say that we need a general solution. 
We need a solution, and a general solution is worth wanting because it is parsimonious. 
But if we cannot find a general solution, then we might need particular solutions. 
Tännsjö begins with Davidson’s climber, who intends ‘to rid himself of the 
weight and danger of holding another man on a rope’ by loosening his grip on the rope. 
This intention causes a state of nervousness, which causes the loosening of his hold 
(Davidson 1980: 79). According to Tännsjö, every type of action ‘carries its own criteria 
of rightness with respect to causal chains’ (471). In this case, ‘it is crucial that the climber 
has control of the movements of his hands’, and Tännsjö suggests that this type of case 
can be solved in accordance with my proposal (ibid.). But he thinks that other types of 
cases require different solutions: 
 
With respect to other acts, such as kicking, it is not necessary that every 
movement of the legs of the person who kicks a ball is responsive to any wish for 
them to move that way; the movements should be caused by his desire, but need 
not be in Schlosser’s sense ‘responsive’ to it. (ibid.) 
 
But no proponent of the causal theory has ever suggested that ‘every movement of the 
legs’ during an action such as kicking a ball must be responsive to the agent’s intention—
and I certainly did not either. Moreover, it is also not necessary that ‘every movement’ of 
the climber’s hands is responsive to the mental antecedent. There is, in this respect, no 
difference between the cases. 
Then Tännsjö goes on to distinguish his kicking the ball from a professional 
player’s ‘bending it like Beckham’, suggesting that they constitute two different types of 
cases. The professional player differs from ordinary mortals, when they kick a ball, in 
two important respects. First, the player has an ability to control that most of us lack. 
Second, the degree of control that this agent has over this type of action is less than the 
degree of control that we have over many of our actions. 
The first point is due to differences in talent and practice. The player has acquired 
the ability to bend it like Beckham in years of training, developing a natural talent. This is 
why this agent can reasonably form the intention to bend it like Beckham. The second 
point concerns the limits of control. No matter how hard our player practices, she will 
never gain full control over the action. This is not a special case. We all know some 
actions over which we have only some control. The limits of intentional control are set by 
the limits of the underlying causal mechanisms. If it is impossible, for an agent, to 
acquire a motor-programme that fully governs a movement that would constitute an A-ing, 
then this agent will not be able to gain full control over A-ing. Both points raise difficult 
questions concerning the relationships between the intentional control of action and the 
underlying non-intentional control of movements. But they do not require a revision of 
the theory at the intentional level. 
Suppose that the player intends to bend it like Beckham. Presumably, this results 
in some adjustments in her movement that would not have occurred, had she merely 
intended to kick the ball. These adjustments, it seems, are made in response to the content 
of the intention. Of course, they do not guarantee that the player will be successful in 
bending it like Beckham. This is because the control mechanisms that underlie that action 
are much less reliable than the mechanisms that underlie an action such as kicking a ball. 
This is perfectly compatible with my view, which requires that the mental antecedents of 
action must be causally efficacious in virtue of content, not that they must causally 
determine the action. 
One may think that there is a problem in case the attempt is unsuccessful. If the 
player fails, then the intention to bend it like Beckham does not cause that type of action. 
But we can assume the player will be successful in kicking the ball. What action is 
caused in virtue of what content? 
This only highlights the fact that bending it like Beckham is not a basic action. In 
order to bend it like Beckham, one must perform a certain type of kicking movement. In 
order to do that intentionally, one must intend to perform that type of kicking. And 
someone who intends to perform a certain type of kicking intends to perform a kicking. 
Further, only basic actions must be caused in virtue of content. Non-basic actions must 
merely match the content of the corresponding non-basic intention (compare Schlosser 
2007: 189-90, for instance). So, the player’s intention to perform a certain type of kicking 
causes a kicking move in virtue of content. This basic action gives rise to the action of 
kicking the ball, but it fails to give rise to an action that matches the content of the non-
basic intention to bend it like Beckham. 
There is no need for a particular solution to this type of case. My general solution 
works perfectly well. Furthermore, I should point out that Tännsjö has not really given us 
a particular solution to this case. All he says is that, intuitively, ‘we have a clear enough 
feel for the different causal requirements with respect to just kicking a ball and bending it 
like Beckham’ (2007: 471). But there is no indication of what these causal requirements 
might be, and so there is no indication of what different solutions to different cases of 
causal deviance might actually look like. 
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